Did chamberlain do the right thing? (Debate)
Professor John Charmley
Sir Richard Evans
  • Appeasement was a long term policy.
  • The British public had no appetite for war - the legacy of WWI, fresh memories of battles such as the Somme.
  • Britain was badly hit by the Great Depression - the British treasury would not sanction spending on armaments.
  • Britain had no reliable allies - the USA were following a policy of isolationism.
  • It was not a weak policy - it was a policy to ‘give peace a chance, to see if peace was possible.
  • It was accompanied by a ‘gradual’ rearmament programme, including air defences. (Radar & Spitfire aeroplanes, that helped win the Battle for Britain in 1940)
  • It was not ‘Peace at any price - it was ‘an iron fist inside a velvet glove’.
Summary - It was not the ‘wrong’ policy, it was the only ‘conceivable policy’ at the time. An ‘honorable’ attempt to see if peace could work, whilst making cautious preparations for war.
  • Early on it was evident the Nazi regime was a ‘murderous’ regime & Appeasing them was the wrong approach. (British Ambassador- Sir Eric Phipps)
  • German militarism would need confronting, not appeasing.
  • Chamberlain was shortsighted when he replaced Phipps with Henderson who ‘admired’ Goring.
  • Chamberlain misunderstood Hitler - he thought he could be reasoned with. Treated him as a ‘conventional’ statesman.
  • Chamberlain ignored secret memos from MI5 warning him that Hitler held Chamberlain in contempt.
  • There were forces within Germany that did not want war - appeasement undermined them.
  • The Czechs had a strong army & defensible borders as well as a will to fight.
  • Not opposing the Rhineland, Anschluss and Sudetenland only convinced Hitler Britain was weak.
  • Appeasement based on the premise Hitler only wanted to revise the Treaty of Versailles - this was a big mistake. His ‘worldview’ was well known. He was planning war from the outset.
Summary - Appeasement was not in Britain’s National interest for political & military (e.g Disaster of Dunkirk) reasons - Hitler could have been deterred by a show of force.
Does this extract support Charmley or Evans?
Transcript of Conclusion of Note from General Ismay to the British Cabinet sent on September 20th, 1938 (CAB 21/544)
15. The broad conclusions of this Note may be summarized as follows :-

(a) A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present.
(b) So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her lead over the Franco-British Air Forces in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provided that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defence (both active and passive) against air attack. By so doing we shall have heavily insured ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are present exposed: indeed by substantially reducing Germany's only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt.
(c) It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time is in our favour and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months' time, than to accept the present challenge.